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 4 
Abstract 5 
The post-disaster period is critical for reducing vulnerability and building resilience. Social capital 6 
plays an important role in generating and maintaining risk reducing behaviour and a rich evidence 7 
base demonstrating its contribution to the recovery process exists. Yet, so far little distinction has 8 
been made between the different types of social capital, despite important variations of outcomes. 9 
To address this gap, this article examines the evolving roles of specific forms of social capital on the 10 
long-term post-disaster recovery process. We explore the disaster recovery process on the active 11 
volcanic island of Montserrat in the Caribbean, marked by rapid and intense post-disaster 12 
demographic change following the beginning of the eruption in 1995. We explore the challenges of 13 
the shift from a relatively homogenous to a relatively diverse population for building a resilient society. 14 
Our investigation illustrates the complexity of the recovery process and the coexistence of conflicting 15 
objectives which, if poorly managed, can create new forms of vulnerability and impede the 16 
sustainability of the development process. We argue that not all forms of social capital development 17 
are beneficial for the long-term recovery process. In a diversifying society, bonding social capital may 18 
have perverse effect while bridging and linking social capital may be key for building social cohesion, 19 
a key contributor to sustainable development. We argue that measures for re-development should be 20 
sensitive to the long-term effects of different forms of social capital, in particular their consequences 21 
for building social cohesion, a key contributor to sustainable recovery in a dynamically changing 22 
society. 23 
 24 
1. Introduction 25 
Post-disaster periods give rise to major short-term and long-term challenges for affected 26 
communities. In addition to facing emergency response’ needs, recovery measures have direct and 27 
indirect impacts on the long-term development trajectory of an affected society. Yet, the complexity 28 
of the long-term recovery processes and the multiplicity of its dimensions remains relatively 29 
underexplored.  30 
A growing number of studies have shown that social capital is a key driver of sustainable recovery 31 
[1], [2]. It can prevent marginalisation of some social groups [2]–[4], support preparedness to disaster 32 
and risk awareness [1], [5]–[7], or even support trust between social groups and decision-makers [8]–33 
[10]. Yet, social capital can also have a perverse effect on long-term recovery by reinforcing 34 
inequalities [11]–[14] or by encouraging harmful behaviours [12], [13], [15], [16]. There is therefore a 35 
need for a more careful attention on the paradoxical effects of social capital for long-term recovery. 36 
A distinction between different forms of social capital, namely bonding, bridging and linking, enables 37 
a better understanding of their evolving roles and influences through different stages of the post-38 
disaster recovery process. This study is one of relatively few to explore the role of specific forms of 39 
social capital for supporting sustainable post-disaster recovery. Here we aim to provide more 40 
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understanding of the obstacles to reducing vulnerability, building resilience and lessening the risk of 41 
recurrence in future. 42 
Using an ethnographic approach, we analyse the case of Montserrat, a Caribbean British Overseas 43 
Territory, severely affected by volcanic eruptions from 1995 to 20101. One of the main long term 44 
impacts of the disaster is the rapid demographic change due to high levels of both emigration, with 45 
the departure of affected people, and the immigration of workers from neighbour countries. Here, we 46 
explore the challenges of the shift from a relatively homogenous to a relatively diverse population for 47 
building a resilient and sustainable society. The paper illustrates the complexity of the post-disaster 48 
recovery process and the coexistence of conflicting objectives which, if not well managed, can create 49 
new forms of vulnerability and hence impede the sustainability of the development process. We argue 50 
that measures for re-development should be sensitive to the effects of different forms of social capital, 51 
in particular their consequences for building social cohesion, a key contributor to sustainable 52 
development, in a dynamically changing society. 53 
After briefly reviewing relevant research literature on disaster, recovery processes and social 54 
capital to establish the basis for our analysis, we describe the empirical case study focus for the paper, 55 
and outline the methodology employed in the research. We then explore the role of different forms 56 
of social capital through the post-disaster period and their implications for the long-term recovery 57 
process and resilience building. We conclude by highlighting the importance of promoting a shift from 58 
bonding to bridging social capital in a diversifying society in order to build resilience. 59 
 60 
2. Disaster, post-disaster recovery and social capital  61 
2.1. Recovery 62 
Post-disaster recovery is discussed mainly in terms of response, rehabilitation, restoration and 63 
reconstruction but rarely are the long-term dynamics considered. Recently, the focus of disasters 64 
research has been at decadal-scale post-disaster recovery and directed towards vulnerability 65 
reduction [17]. The post-disaster decision-making process is challenged by the consequences of the 66 
disaster and the loss of resources. Yet, it plays a crucial role in determining the long-term recovery 67 
trajectory of affected communities. It is an opportune time for learning from past events in order to 68 
create a more resilient society [18]–[20]. The Hyogo Framework for Action for 2005-2015 and the 69 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction for 2015-2030 have institutionalized this in the principle 70 
of “Build-Back-Better” [19]. It distinguishes the recovery process from the idea of a “return to normal”, 71 
i.e. to the conditions existing before the disaster, to a need for change and improvement in order to 72 
reduce the impact of drivers of vulnerability to natural hazards. Hence, it recognizes the need to 73 
include preparedness measures within the recovery period, instead of considering them as separate 74 
stages of the disaster cycle.  75 
While building-back-better and learning from experience is ideal, it remains challenging to 76 
understand the post-disaster recovery process and the recipe for its sustainability. Indeed, the 77 
recovery process encompasses multiple dimensions, e.g. physical, environmental, social, 78 
psychological or demographic, each proceeding at a different pace and interacting with the others, in 79 
ways that might facilitate or impede them [21]–[23]. It is critical to understand these interactions in 80 
                                                          
1 As of May 2019, the eruption is still officially ongoing although activity at the volcano remains low. 
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order to implement sustainable practices, reduce vulnerability and build resilience. The sustainability 81 
of the process is strongly linked with the concept of resilience [24]–[27], which is seen as “the intrinsic 82 
capacity of a system, community or society predisposed to a shock or stress to adapt and survive by 83 
changing its non-essential attributes and rebuilding itself” [25]. It presupposes a learning process that 84 
prevents reproducing pre-disaster status-quo [28] [29], although policy-makers and affected people 85 
commonly attempt to recreate the resources lost during the disaster and the environment with which 86 
they were familiar. Recovery processes build on pre-existing social structures, culture and values, in 87 
order to create a more resilient and sustainable future. They can, in turn, reproduce existing social 88 
inequalities or, inadvertently, create new sources of vulnerability to disaster [30]. 89 
We argue that there are learning processes taking place at different levels in the recovery 90 
process, implemented through policy and practices, that contribute to determine how adaptive or 91 
maladaptive is society’s transformation, and hence the sustainability of the implemented change [26], 92 
[31], [32]. Although there has been much research on the best approaches to reduce the risk of 93 
disaster and address vulnerabilities, there are relatively few studies of the challenges of implementing 94 
measures for DRR in a post-disaster period, a period of transition marked by multiple disruptions to 95 
society. 96 
2.2. Social capital, disaster and recovery 97 
2.2.1. What is social capital? 98 
The concept of social capital has been used increasingly in recent years to explain differences in 99 
economic, social and political development [8], [33]. While this concept has initially been developed 100 
and understood by the sociologists Bourdieu and Coleman as a private good, beneficial at the 101 
individual or small group level [34], disasters and post-disaster development research tends to be 102 
informed by the collective perspective of Robert Putnam. His concept focuses on the collective 103 
outcomes of connectedness between people and the structural effects of social capital on community 104 
or national development. He describes social capital as, “the features of social organizations, such as 105 
networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit” [35]. He 106 
elaborates on this, noting how these, “intangible resources of community, shared values and trust 107 
upon which we draw in daily life […] can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 108 
actions” [35]. 109 
The understanding and measurement of social capital are made difficult by the different contexts 110 
to which the concept is applied and the purposes to which it is put [15]. However, a distinction can be 111 
drawn between bridging, bonding and linking social capital [8], which in turn is related to the 112 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of groups [3], [15]. Bonding social capital refers to social ties that link 113 
people together with others who are primarily like them in some key respect (e.g. community, race, 114 
religion). It often characterizes homogenous groups [2]. Bridging social capital refers to social ties that 115 
link people across social differences and divides [36]. Linking social capital refers to ties with people 116 
with access to power [37]. This third type introduces a more hierarchical dimension, although in many 117 
cases it can overlap significantly with bridging networks. 118 
Despite its analytical limits [38], [39], such a distinction is critical since the different forms of social 119 
capital contribute differently to adaptation [40], development and social cohesion,[39], [41]. Putnam 120 
argues that bonding social capital, “is good for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing 121 
solidarity” [8]. It reinforces conformity and solidarity but can be, as a consequence, exclusive to the 122 
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others, those who do not share this conformity [39]. Importantly, research demonstrates that 123 
homogenous communities often display stronger bonding social capital than heterogeneous ones, but 124 
less bridging and linking social capital [3], [42]. Putnam also maintains that bridging social capital is 125 
inclusive and enables, “linkage to external assets [and] information diffusion” [8]. Correspondingly, 126 
research has demonstrated that in heterogeneous populations bridging social capital has greater 127 
value, because it enables exposure to, exchanges and development of ideas and values, and hence 128 
enhances social cohesion [3], [15], [43]. 129 
 130 
2.2.2. Social capital, disasters, and recovery 131 
The importance of social capital and social cohesion for development and resilience is now widely 132 
acknowledged [1], [2], [6]. As disasters are intimately linked to daily life and development processes 133 
[24], social capital plays a critical role in reducing the risk of disaster [2], [5], [6], [44], [45] and for post-134 
disaster recovery [46], [47]. Murphy [6] also claims that the value of social capital as a lens through 135 
which disasters can be analysed is in, “its emphasis on the role of community members as active 136 
agents rather than passive victims”. In a review of the literature, Meyer [1] shows that social capital 137 
has a positive impact on mitigation and adaptation strategies. Reflecting on post-disaster context, 138 
Aldrich [44] argues that social capital is, “the strongest and most robust predictor of population 139 
recovery after catastrophe”. Pelling and High [40] suggest that the growing interest in social capital 140 
enables us to better understand the role played by social attributes, in particular social networks and 141 
norms, in the production of adaptive capacity and adaptive actions to environmental change, a view 142 
echoed in other studies [48]. Because of the importance of social change [2], [49], [50] and social 143 
capital in the recovery process, several authors have called for a re-orientation of recovery 144 
programmes, from the established approach focused mainly on physical infrastructure to programmes 145 
that target forms of social infrastructure, like social capital [2], [17], [41], [51].  146 
Social capital can facilitate access to a variety of resources, including information, social support, 147 
and financial aid [2]–[4], that can prevent the marginalization of individuals or communities, support 148 
their awareness of risks and level of preparedness, and hence reduce their level of vulnerability to 149 
disaster. Trust, a critical element of social capital, is particularly critical for facilitation, coordination, 150 
cooperation and communication [8]–[10], [14] before, during and after a disaster. It also contributes 151 
to shaping collective and individual actions [40], [44], [52], and to encouraging the participation of the 152 
different stakeholders in decision-making [8]. Research shows that trust, inclusion and participation 153 
in decision-making have been major factors in successful community-level preparedness, mitigation 154 
and adaptation [1], [40]. Moreover, numerous studies have shown that bonding, bridging and linking 155 
social capital are complementary during and after crises, playing different roles [2]. For example, 156 
research has found that a high level of bridging social capital is generally associated with a higher level 157 
of preparedness [1], [5]–[7] and better access to information and supplies during the recovery process 158 
[3]. Linking social capital is particularly valuable as it provides access to power structures and 159 
institutions [3], [43]. During the post-disaster period, affected individuals and communities tend to 160 
rely primarily in their bonding social capital, in particular their family members, for immediate support, 161 
mainly through the supply of provisions [2], [49]. Studies have demonstrated that strong bonding 162 
social capital increases the likelihood of collective action for recovery [2], [14], [46], [53], [54] and can 163 
reduce the reliance on external support and aid. Hsueh [47] also emphasized the complementary role 164 
of the three forms of capital after a typhoon, and the higher support rates and recovery satisfaction 165 
among the people who had higher bridging and linking network, compared to those relying exclusively 166 
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on their bonding network. Yet, the nature of the social fabric is not specified, hence it makes the 167 
generalisation of those results to another case study difficult. 168 
 169 
The availability of these different forms of social capital also evolves over time, and is context 170 
dependent. Islam & Walkerden [55] found that immediately after extreme weather events, 171 
communities in Bangladesh relied heavily on both their bonding and bridging social capital. As time 172 
elapsed, however, they found that only bonding networks continued to be active, while bridging 173 
relationships tended to weaken because of poverty, conflict or competition over access to resources 174 
or external support. The same analysis was made by Masud-All-Kamal & Monirul Assan [56] a few 175 
years later, still in Bangladesh, as they highlighted that linking social capital eventually was used for 176 
the benefit of a few only. Although other research has found that the role of bridging social capital 177 
grows over time after disaster [1], [3], [4], there is evidence that bonding networks, because of their 178 
exclusivity, can tend to prevent the development of bridging social networks [11]–[13]. 179 
 180 
The existing studies focus on the use of social capital. There is a need to analyse how the later can 181 
be adjusted and transform to promote sustainable recovery. The negative externalities of social capital 182 
must be considered as they can alter the recovery process and resilience building [12]–[14]. 183 
Recognizing the perverse effects of social capital is essential in order to adapt policies and 184 
development projects during the post-disaster period [12], [13]. Research has highlighted two major 185 
downsides of bonding social capital in particular. First, when a group is linked by strong ties that lead 186 
to the exclusion of outsiders, it can reinforce social and economic inequalities [11]–[14]. In their study 187 
of the recovery process following Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, Aldrich and Crook [57] show that 188 
strong local networks benefited only some sections of society. While they provided resources for a 189 
fast and efficient recovery for a large part of the society, they also tended to exclude those who were 190 
‘outsiders’ to those social networks, and hence it encouraged resistance against certain recovery 191 
needs. A high level of bonding social capital can also increase the incidence of risky behaviours due to 192 
individuals following or helping other members of the community [1], [58]. These studies emphasize 193 
the paradoxical roles of social capital within the recovery processes, and hence the need to better 194 
contextualise the process, both in terms of social fabric and recovery needs and objectives for short 195 
and long-term. Here, we argue that different forms of social capital should be strategically thought 196 
and developed, informed by these studies, in order to promote sustainable capital.  197 
 198 
3. Study area 199 
This research was conducted on the island of Montserrat, a small British Overseas Territory 200 
located in the Caribbean that was severely affected by volcanic eruptions from 1995 to 2010. The first 201 
eruption occurred only six years after Hurricane Hugo had devastated about 90% of the country’s 202 
infrastructure. The Soufrière Hills Volcano, located in the South of the island, became active after more 203 
than 300 years of dormancy. In 1997, the southern two-thirds of the island was evacuated and remains 204 
an uninhabited exclusion zone (Figure 1). Pyroclastic flows and lahars destroyed the capital city, 205 
Plymouth, and most of the major infrastructure. Although the last significant activity occurred in 2010, 206 
the volcano is still active, with continued uncertainty regarding the level of risk [59]. 207 
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Figure 1: Position of  Montserrat in the Lesser Antilles island arc [60] 209 
The disaster gave rise to transformative social changes. In 1998, three years after the 210 
beginning of the crisis, three-quarters of the population of about 10,300 emigrated to the UK or to 211 
neighbouring Caribbean countries. This was largely in response to relocation schemes set up by the 212 
British government. The rest of the population, reduced at its lowest point to only 2,400 inhabitants, 213 
and including dislocated families, had to relocate to the underdeveloped North of the country. The 214 
Montserratian government decided, in 1998, to attract immigrants from other Caribbean countries to 215 
encourage demographic growth, support rebuilding and compensate for the loss of skilled workers. 216 
From 2002, the population started to increase again thanks to immigration, stabilizing between 4,000 217 
and 5,000. Reliable data are not available but it is estimated by Montserratian officials that as much 218 
as half of the current population is composed of immigrants, mainly from Guyana, Jamaica and the 219 
Dominican Republic. As a result, the population profile is considerably changed, from the relatively 220 
homogenous society that existed before the disaster, composed of only 19% non-Montserratians2, to 221 
the very diverse society of today. It is because of this process of rapid, disaster-induced social change 222 
and its consequences for post-disaster recovery that Montserrat was chosen as the empirical focus 223 
for this study. The aim of the research was to examine how the different forms of social capital 224 
contributes to the sustainability of post-disaster recovery.  225 
It may be objected that Montserrat, given the prolonged nature of the volcanic eruption and 226 
the relative scale of displacement and subsequent depopulation, represents an extreme case. The 227 
rationale for choosing it is as a focus for this study is that it more starkly highlights processes that need 228 
to be understood and enable lessons to be learned that may be relevant to more typical situations 229 
                                                          
2 Data provided by the Department of Statistics of the Government of Montserrat in 2016 
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[61]. Montserrat shares common characteristics with small island developing states that are 230 
vulnerable to volcanic or other natural hazards. Without claiming that the specificities of the situation 231 
in Montserrat can be generalised, we can, nonetheless, learn from its experience and glean insights 232 
about the role of social capital in processes of post-disaster recovery that may be transferred to other 233 
settings. They will have particular relevance for other places with a relatively homogenous population 234 
that face rapid demographic change after a disaster. 235 
 236 
4. Methods 237 
The researcher (Monteil) spent a total of nine months on Montserrat, in April 2015, January-238 
May 2016 and January-March 2017, and used a variety of qualitative data collection methods to study 239 
post-disaster recovery processes, including ethnographic observation with detailed field notes; both 240 
semi-structured and informal interviews; and focus group discussions. Multiple methods were used 241 
to triangulate the data, adjust to the sensitivity of the subject, and to capture both the said and non-242 


















1 Government officers (British and 
Montserratian government) from 
different departments 
21 21  9 12 30-60 
2 Risk management/ monitoring 
institutions (Disaster Management 
Coordination Agency, Montserrat 
Volcano Observatory, Red Cross) 
10 10  5 5 30-60 
3 Social/Health/Educational 
institutions (like social services, 
schools, churches) 
16 16  12 4 30-65 
4 Business people 5 5  2 3 25-55 
5 Montserratians 20 8 12 7 13 20-75 
6 Guyanese 14 8 6 8 6 15-65 
7 Jamaicans 14 6 8 6 8 20-65 
8 Dominicans from Dominican 
Republic3 12 7 5 5 7 45-70 
9 Other nationalities 18 3 15 4 14 30-60 
 Total 130 84 46 58 72  
Table 1:  Interviews conducted between 2014 and 2018 in Montserrat - (The members of risk management, social/health 244 
institutions and business people (categories 2, 3, 4) were both Montserratians and non-Montserratians). 245 
Despite repeated efforts, it was not possible to convene a focus group of immigrants from the 246 
Dominican Republic. Observation was mainly focusing on the type and level of interactions between 247 
social groups, of participation to various sorts of activities organised by NGOs, government, schools 248 
or communities themselves. It was also focusing on people’s reactions to development programs and 249 
policy changes. All data, including notes and audio records, were transcribed, and then coded in NVivo 250 
for triangulation and analysis. The process of coding evolved throughout the analysis, corresponding 251 
overall to the three stages defined by Charmaz [62] as the initial coding, the focused coding and the 252 
                                                          
3 The latter are referred to in this article as Dominicans but should not be confused with people originating on 
the Caribbean island of Dominica, of whom there are also a number living on Montserrat.  
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theoretical coding. Data were analysed with guidance and constant comparison with the conceptual 253 
framework developed earlier. It is important to acknowledge the practical difficulties encountered 254 
during the data collection process and how they may have influenced the results. Data collection 255 
methods had to be adapted after entering the field because of the sensitivity of the topics tackled in 256 
this study, which often made it impossible to make audio-recordings or even taking notes during most 257 
interviews. The consequent reliance on the researcher’s memory when making notes after the event 258 
may have led to some inaccuracies or inadvertent omissions. Moreover, it was challenging for the 259 
researcher as a young white woman to gain access to some individuals or groups within the different 260 
communities in order to conduct interviews or group discussions. The researcher made efforts to 261 
minimise any impact that these practical challenges might have on the dependability of the study by 262 
triangulating data from each interview with those collected from other data sources.  263 
 264 
5. Results and discussion 265 
Analysis of the post-disaster recovery processes in Montserrat highlights the complex role of social 266 
capital. In this section, we first review briefly the adverse effects of the disaster on social links and 267 
social cohesion on the island. We then examine how efforts to re-establish a sense of cultural 268 
normality and economic stability for the remaining Montserratian population, which have perverse 269 
implications for both social cohesion and disaster risk reduction, come into conflict with long-term 270 
sustainability goals. Finally, we examine efforts to create and reinforce forms of social capital that 271 
contribute to social cohesion.  272 
5.1. Disruption of social links during the volcanic crisis 273 
The eruption of the Soufriere Hills Volcano in 1995 was followed by several episodes of intense 274 
activity, the most recent in 2010. It prompted the evacuation of the capital city, Plymouth, and 275 
surrounding villages, that were partly destroyed in 1997 by pyroclastic flows [63]. The evacuations of 276 
the Southern and Eastern parts of the Island led to significant disturbance of Montserrat’s physical 277 
and social environment [64]–[66]. The displacement of most of the population, first within the country 278 
and then, for 75% of Montserratians, off the island, led to a breakdown of the social fabric, both at 279 
household level and at community level [67]. New interviews revealed that some families remain 280 
separated twenty years after the beginning of the crisis. The break-up of communities also led to a 281 
transformation of social practices, in particular relating to social care for children and the elderly, and 282 
to a persistent sense of loss and of nostalgia for the old neighborhoods and communities. About this 283 
rapid transformation, a policy-maker said during an interview in May 2016:  284 
 285 
“Our sense of what is being a Montserratian is lost, […] all those kinds of things that are deeply 286 
embedded in the culture. People […] have anxiety because those things are being lost and also 287 
they have anxiety because young people are leaving […] so there is this feeling that for some 288 
people they really don't want to come to turn to the fact that it's a completely new Montserrat.” 289 
 290 
The rapid immigration of other nationalities and ethnicities since the beginning of the crisis has for 291 
many Montserratians compounded this acute sense of disruption and loss. That immigrant groups 292 
have come to constitute, in just two decades, about half of the total population has ramifications for 293 
the development trajectory of the country, for power relations between social groups, and for cultural 294 
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practices. This dramatic influx of ‘foreigners’, economically and politically necessary in the absence of 295 
a return by large numbers of the Montserratians who left the country during the volcanic crisis, is 296 
experienced by many who remained as bringing an additional unwanted transformation to their 297 
society. The presence of these new immigrants consequently has become the focus of critical public 298 
comment, which often reveals the fears of ordinary Montserratians and their rejection of these 299 
groups. During interviews and informal conversations, Montserratians frequently emphasized the 300 
differences between native Montserratians and the three main immigrant groups and expressed 301 
disquiet or anger at the changes that have accompanied the arrival of these new residents. 302 
Immigration was encouraged to address the shortage of workers that resulted from the mass exodus 303 
from the island during the volcanic crisis. Inevitably this has led to increased competition in some 304 
sectors of the labor market, as the incomers, in the way of economic migrants worldwide, are often 305 
more ready to accept working conditions and levels of pay that are not attractive to Montserratians. 306 
Immigration is also blamed by some for a perceived increase in crime and for a loss of traditional 307 
values. This is fervently expressed in a contribution by a Montserratian, in February 2016, to a public 308 
discussion on Facebook: 309 
“After [immigrants] finish doing what they came to Montserrat to do, I say send them 310 
back home to Jamaica or wherever they came from. Soon they will start making 311 
children and start telling us, THE NATIVES, how to live in our own island. We don’t need 312 
other people from other countries coming here and dictate to us. Soon they will [bring] 313 
their criminals elements with them.” 314 
The post-disaster period hence began with an important disruption of the pre-existing social capital. 315 
Bonding social networks have been broken down first by the quick and large emigration of the 316 
previously homogenous social group. This has been rapidly intensified by the immigration of foreign 317 
labour, strategically attracted as a recovery strategy, and thus with the transformation of the society 318 
as a heterogeneous group. 319 
5.2. Recovery process challenged by contradictory priorities 320 
The multitude of needs and objectives during the post-disaster period make conflicts, 321 
compromise and trade-offs inevitable. The psychological dimension of recovery plays an important 322 
role, especially in a small society like Montserrat, where decision-makers and citizens are closely 323 
connected. A large part of the decision-making therefore aims to reinforce the sense of stability and 324 
safety of the Montserratian social group, despite the long-term implications it may have. That 325 
proceeds mainly by multiple efforts to restore – or recreate - the society as it used to be; that is 326 
homogenous and centred around the Montserratian social group, which has the largely unintended 327 
consequence of preventing the integration of non-Montserratians groups. It emphasizes in particular 328 
the objective of restoring a strong bonding social capital. 329 
Hence, although there is a persisting need for demographic and economic growth, decision-330 
makers have made it explicit that it should be addressed by encouraging the return of the 331 
Montserratian diaspora. Yet, return of diaspora has been proved relatively difficult, mainly because of 332 
lack of jobs and housing, and remains slow according to Montserratian officials. Institutional 333 
measures, such as immigration control through enforcement of work permit regulations, the 334 
tightening of visa renewal procedures and naturalisation process to achieve British citizenship, aim to 335 
coax potential returnees back by making it challenging for immigrants to work and stay in Montserrat. 336 
Moreover, despite the demand for highly qualified and skilled workers, amplified by the emigration of 337 
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Montserratians during the volcanic crisis (Halcrow Group Limited, 2012; Sword-Daniels et al., 2014), 338 
informal measures attempt to restrict access to certain jobs, in particular governmental jobs, to 339 
Montserratians. The national newspaper states on its page for job advert: 340 
“All employers are reminded of Section 4.8 of the Work Permit Policy which requires 341 
that ‘Every job being offered to a non-belonger must have first been advertised 342 
extensively in the media in order to give local persons a fair opportunity to apply’. Proof 343 
of such advertisement must be submitted to the Labour Department when making 344 
application for Work Permits” [68]. 345 
Interviews with both Montserratians and non-Montserratians have shown that the term ‘local 346 
persons’ is often understood as a person of Montserratian origin. It leads to a widely spread and 347 
unquestioned belief that priority for employment must be given to Montserratians, while the article 348 
79 of the Labour Code [69] states that no discrimination should occur. In practice, this divides the job 349 
market by nationality of origin and effectively restricts access to employment in the public sector to 350 
the Montserratian community. The post-disaster recovery process is fraught with conflicting 351 
objectives in a context of social fabric transformation. On the one hand, the need to restore stability 352 
and sense of ‘normality’ is demonstrated by efforts at national scales to reinforce bonding social 353 
capital among the remaining Montserratian social group. On the other hand, the objectives of 354 
economic, physical and demographic recovery require a better consideration of the diversification of 355 
the society through the development of bringing and linking social networks. 356 
5.3. Shaping cultural identity as strengthening Montserratian bonding capital 357 
During the volcanic crisis, in the face of catastrophic disruption, a strong sense of collective 358 
identity and shared adversity helped those Montserratians who remained on the island to endure, 359 
adapt and begin the process of recovery. The post-disaster period, however, has been marked by the 360 
question of what it means to be Montserratian, a question regularly discussed publicly in media and 361 
often a subject of great interest both for those who remained and those who left the country. Shaping 362 
cultural identity with the aim of restoring a sense of Montserratian society “as it used to be”, a notion 363 
often asserted by native residents, has been an important response to the rapid post-disaster socio-364 
cultural changes.  365 
Montserratian identity is expressed publicly in specific practices, which are celebrated and asserted 366 
during national cultural events, such as the Christmas or St Patrick’s Day festivals. These practices 367 
contribute to the symbolic construction of a Montserratian sense of community, citing cultural 368 
references that bring the included group together and distinguish it from others [70]. They also 369 
emphasize values that are seen as distinctly Montserratian, such as the sense of hospitality and the 370 
quietness, but are felt to be endangered by immigration. A Montserratian academic explains:  371 
“The essence of Montserratness is captured in maroons, […] calypsos, steelbands, 372 
masquerades and string bands. It is also manifested in dressing in one’s ‘Saturday and 373 
Sunday best’, the ‘strangers’ paradise’ hospitality, ‘the-morning-neighbour-morning’ 374 
greeting, the communal joys and sorrows and an exciting ‘Montserrat English’ (dialect). 375 
There is no Montserratness without these Irish legacy: the Shamrock, the Lady and the 376 
Harp, St Patrick’s Day, goat water, surnames such as Allen, Bramble, Dyer, O’Brien, 377 
O’Garro, Riley and Tuitt.” [71].  378 
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This construction of Montserratian culture emphasizes elements drawn from a specific representation 379 
of the pre-disaster society. Although this can be seen as the expression of a desire to emphasize 380 
cultural continuity after the collective trauma of the disaster and the subsequent social changes, it 381 
also arises from a conscious questioning of what constitutes the Montserratian identity, something 382 
that was not such a focus of concern during the pre-disaster period when this identity was not felt to 383 
be threatened and hence was not questioned. One consequence of this has been a greater emphasis 384 
on Montserratian cultural practices and a stronger assertion of a specific identity than was the case 385 
prior to 1995. This is not, however, viewed as an unmitigated good by all of the island’s residents. 386 
Three community workers, Montserratian and non-Montserratian, from different organizations who 387 
were interviewed expressed regret that cultural events emphasize very little of the post-disaster 388 
characteristics. For instance, while several events celebrate the villages that were abandoned during 389 
the volcanic eruptions as part of the national heritage, some of the interviewed community workers, 390 
of different origins (including a Montserratian) regret that there is no equivalent for the new villages. 391 
One community worker explained that the exclusive focus on abandoned villages prevents the 392 
development of social cohesion and of pride in the newly built neighbourhoods. This was echoed 393 
during a focus group with a group of Guyanese women, who explained that they do not like the period 394 
of the St Patrick’s festival because its cultural exclusivity reminds them that they do not belong in this 395 
culture. 396 
Hence, while the reinforcement of Montserratian cultural identity strengthens the bonding capital of 397 
the Montserratian community, weakened by two decades of rapid demographic transformation, it 398 
simultaneously obstructs the creation of closer connections between different social groups and the 399 
cultivation of bridging social capital. It therefore excludes non-native Montserratians, who represent 400 
about half of the population and who play a critical role in the economic and physical development of 401 
the island, from the process of collective identity construction that is so important to social cohesion.  402 
5.4. Promoting social cohesion to promote sustainable recovery 403 
The post-disaster recovery period is critical for sustainable development in the sense that it aims 404 
to promote changes that support a fully functioning society that is less vulnerable to natural hazards. 405 
Learning from disaster involves, among other things, paying greater attention to factors of 406 
vulnerability. Strong bridging and linking social capital are critical for social cohesion [3], [15], [43], 407 
and hence to resilience and vulnerability reduction, two major aspects of the recovery process [1], [2], 408 
[6]. In order to assess the sustainability of the recovery process among this heterogeneous and 409 
changing society, we analysed the type and impact of initiatives that have gradually emerged during 410 
the post-disaster process and that aim to promote social cohesion and hence  encouraging  sustainable 411 
recovery. They are mainly grassroots initiatives that have been developed as a reaction to the 412 
emerging challenges associated with the cultural diversification of the population. They are initiatives 413 
conducted by government, disaster risk reduction organizations and those involved in welfare 414 
(including churches and schools). Our analysis shows that they are mainly dedicated to the promotion 415 
of some specific aspects of social capital, in particular the creation of shared representations and 416 
meanings between social groups, and less focused on the creation of network of access between social 417 
groups of different origins and trust building [72]. 418 
Because of the increasing diversity of both teachers and pupils, secondary school teachers who were 419 
interviewed highlighted the need for events that foster cultural understanding. One teacher 420 
explained: 421 
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We had a cultural presentation […]. We actually featured the culture of all other 422 
territories, so they were able to share and everybody appreciate each other’s culture. 423 
And that was really essential for the unity of the school. […] We have a number of 424 
students from Santo Domingo, Spanish speaking […]. And the students accepted what 425 
they did, and actually surprisingly […] they were very welcoming. (Interview in 426 
January 2016) 427 
Such initiatives aim to promote some aspects of bridging social capital including sense of trust, 428 
respect, and sense of identity that links social and cultural groups. However, this kind of initiative 429 
remains relatively rare, and limited mainly to a few spaces where interactions between social groups 430 
are critical, such as school and church.  431 
Similarly, sporadic initiatives have aimed to address language barriers faced by two of the 432 
immigrant communities. Teachers pointed to the importance of language classes. Spanish-speaking 433 
students are offered English classes to support them in their academic studies, and hence in their 434 
social integration. However, Spanish classes are also offered to all students. A teacher explained 435 
during an interview that with the increase of the Dominican population, English-speakers also had to 436 
make an effort to communicate with these newcomers. Similar initiatives have begun to address the 437 
language needs of adult immigrants. Bi-lingual leaders in the Haitian and Dominican communities 438 
explained that they translate official documents into, respectively, French Creole and Spanish, to 439 
enable their community members to manage official administrative tasks. A member of the Dominican 440 
community also voluntarily organises English classes on her free time, although this is insufficient to 441 
address the needs of the whole Dominican community. A similar project has been established by a 442 
pastor for the Haitian community. At the time of this study, however, there was no translated 443 
information being offered by government for key services such as health and welfare.  444 
All of the grassroots initiatives described above have emerged from the realisation that with the 445 
increasing diversity of the population, there is a need for better integration. The same observation has 446 
been made by members of the organisations in charge of disaster management and hazards 447 
monitoring. During interviews, they emphasized that language and lack of cohesion were a major issue 448 
for the efficiency of their work. A scientist working at the Montserrat Volcano Observatory (MVO) in 449 
2016 pointed out that he had little knowledge of what constituted effectiveness of MVO’s 450 
communication activities, in particular because he was not sure that immigrant groups use the same 451 
media information sources as Montserratians. The Montserrat Disaster Management Coordination 452 
Agency (DMCA), facing the same issues, has taken the initiative to translate information pamphlets 453 
into several languages. Nevertheless, members of the agency's staff also indicated their uncertainty 454 
about the effectiveness of these measures because of the assumed inadequacy of pamphlets generally 455 
as a communication tool. Despite these efforts, it therefore seems reasonable to infer that differential 456 
access to information continues to be a barrier to communication and awareness raising for disaster 457 
risk reduction that is effective across all social groups.  458 
At the time of the study, measures for promoting social cohesion were mainly focused on 459 
facilitating communication. Apart from the school initiative described above, we have not identified 460 
major measures promoting trust between social groups, a critical element of bridging social capital 461 
[8]–[10]. The Red Cross is the only organisation that explicitly aims to reinforce bridging and linking 462 
social capital through its programs while playing a major role in poverty alleviation and disaster risk 463 
reduction on the island. Several immigrants explained during interviews that volunteering with the 464 
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Red Cross was a way of becoming integrated into the life of the island and to connect to powerful 465 
actors. This is reflected in the composition of the Red Cross’s volunteer team, which includes many 466 
newcomers. Yet, the small number of Montserratians actively involved in the organisation limits its 467 
capacity to build strong links between migrants and non-migrant groups. The organisation also plays 468 
a critical role in giving a legitimate and effective voice to facilitate exchanges with policy-makers, and 469 
hence build linking social capital, crucial for effective recovery process [3], [43]. 470 
The development of both bridging and linking social capital require supporting measures to be 471 
taken at a national level in order to make structural transformations. Although, as we saw earlier, 472 
there are no major national initiatives as a consequence of the existing pressure to restore a form of 473 
‘normality’ that reflects the pre-disaster society, there were indications of an increasing awareness of 474 
the need to foster bridging social capital. Political campaigning during the 2017 by-elections saw calls 475 
for the integration of immigrants. A party political speech broadcast by the opposition ‘Movement for 476 
Change and Prosperity’ (MCAP) party during their campaign couched this in terms of social justice: 477 
“We need a new kind of politics, a politics of inclusion. Instead of creating divisions we 478 
should be breaking down barriers. Everybody on this island deserves to be treated 479 
equally. Do we really think Montserrat is going to progress if we disenfranchise half 480 
the population? […] We want a Government of the people, by the people, and for the 481 
people.” (Radio broadcast by the opposition MCAP party, January 2017) 482 
He argues here that the development of linking social capital could be used consecutively for 483 
supporting the reinforcement of bridging social capital between the different social groups.  484 
The sustainability of the recovery process is still endangered by the lack of major government 485 
initiatives for promoting social cohesion. Yet, there is growing public acknowledgement among the 486 
island’s politicians, similar to what has driven the grassroots initiatives, that social segregation 487 
adversely affects the functioning of society and may be harmful to the Montserrat’s long-term 488 
development.  489 
 490 
6. Conclusion: bonding social capital as an obstacle to sustainable recovery in a diverse society 491 
Among the effects of disaster, social disruption can have significant long-term impacts. In extreme 492 
cases, such as that of Montserrat, this extends to the transformation of the socio-demographic 493 
structure of the society, from a homogenous to a heterogeneous one. These changes in turn may 494 
influence or even determine the trajectory of post-disaster recovery. During this critical period, re-495 
thinking the role of social capital is critical. It can either promote social cohesion, thereby contributing 496 
to reducing vulnerability, or it can create the conditions for future disaster. However, this study 497 
highlights that the conflicting goals of the post-disaster recovery period, in particular the need to 498 
support the psychological and social recovery of affected social groups, as well as economic and other 499 
constraints on policy intervention, can prevent the development of new or altered forms of social 500 
capital in order to adapt to changed post-disaster conditions. The transformation of the social 501 
structure requires adjustment of the type of social capital, in this case to develop bridging and linking 502 
social capital, in order to promote social cohesion, a key factor of a sustainable recovery process.  503 
 504 
Yet, in the case of Montserrat, the need for stability and a sense of normality encourages the 505 
reinforcement, in both formal and informal ways, of the bonding social capital that helped the 506 
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population get through the crisis period. Although this supports the recovery process to some extent, 507 
it also damages the social cohesion within the newly diverse society by obstructing the development 508 
of bridging and linking social capital between the different social groups. There have been ad hoc 509 
grassroots measures aiming to promote bridging and linking social capital, but there remains a major 510 
need for more coordinated measures to support the transformation of social capital in a way that 511 
promotes social cohesion. In the absence of that, in a context of significant demographic 512 
transformation, the resulting recovery trajectory may contribute to maintaining immigrant groups in 513 
a situation of relative marginalization, which in turn is a root driver of vulnerability to disaster [24], an 514 
obstacle to sustainable recovery process. 515 
 516 
More broadly, this study contributes to better understanding of the complexity and specificities of the 517 
different forms of social capital in any affected community or society. While the importance of social 518 
capital for post-disaster recovery is now widely acknowledged, studies often lack more detailed 519 
characterisation and contextualisation, and hence may fail to adequately assess the sustainability of 520 
the recovery process. This study highlights the need to distinguish the different forms of social capital 521 
and their effects, both intended and unintended, in order to adapt them to the long-term needs of 522 
post-disaster recovery, and to better evaluate and coordinate measures taken to promote social 523 
cohesion. It emphasizes how different forms of social capital may be strategically thought and 524 
developed as a tool for a sustainable recovery. 525 
 526 
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